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State Ownership and Earnings Management in Highly-Valued Firms: 
Evidence from China 
Abstract 
 
We examine how state ownership affects Chinese firms’ earning management during a period 
of high valuation. Based on a sample of 19,107 firm-year observations with sufficient data on 
the China Securities Markets and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database over the period 
from 2003 to 2017, we find the magnitude of accruals management first increases for up to 
three years of high valuation, and then reduces after the fourth year. This finding is consistent 
with the view that the difficulty of consistently using accruals to manage earnings upwards 
increases over time because of the reversing nature of accruals. We find that managers turn to 
using real earnings management after four consecutive years of high valuation.  Next, we 
examine whether the degree of earnings management in highly-valued firms differs between 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs). Supporting the 
view that SOE managers have less incentive to sustain high stock prices and manipulate 
earnings upwards, we find evidence that highly-valued SOEs have significantly lower level of 
abnormal accruals than highly-valued NSOEs, and lower levels of real earnings management 
after four consecutive years of high valuation. Our findings contribute to the literature on the 
cross-sectional variation in the relation between managers’ pressure to sustain high stock prices 
and their earnings management behavior in China, an environment where this relation is likely 
to vary substantially between SOEs and NSOEs. Studies using U.S. data typically assume that 
the effects of high valuation on earnings management are uniform across firms. Our findings 
suggest that state ownership affects this relation, i.e., managers of SOEs are less incentivized 
to manage earnings upwards even when their firm’s stocks are highly-valued. 
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State Ownership and Earnings Management in Highly-Valued Firms: 
Evidence from China 
1. Introduction 
The quality of reported earnings in financial statements is of considerable interest to 
practitioners, regulators, and academics. Jensen (2005) suggests that highly-valued equities 
induce managers to engage in earnings management with the purpose of sustaining upward 
trends in earnings and stock price. Using U.S. data, Badertscher (2011) finds that managers’ 
use of earnings management changes with the duration of high valuation. Specifically, in order 
to sustain their high stock price, managers engage in accruals management in the early stages 
before moving to real transactions management. We examine how state ownership affects 
Chinese firms’ earning management during the period of high valuation. We confirm 
Badertscher’s (2011) findings in the Chinese market and, more importantly, we test whether 
this relation differs in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (where the government is the ultimate 
controlling shareholder) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) (where private entities or 
individuals are the controlling shareholder) in China. Agency costs are associated with earnings 
management, and ownership structure is a primary determinant of agency costs; therefore, we 
link a company’s ownership structure with their earnings management behavior. 
SOEs and NSOEs in China differ in the nature of their ownership, agency problems, 
and governance mechanisms, which leads to differences in incentives and ability to manipulate 
earnings. The uniqueness of the Chinese setting allows us to compare the effects of audit quality 
across two groups of firms with different ownership structures. We propose two competing 
predictions on how state ownership affects the relation between sustained high valuation and 
earnings management. On the one hand, managers of SOEs have double identities as both 
businessman and government agents. Their promotions are largely based on fulfilling the 
various political and social objectives than by achieving superior operating and financial 
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performance (Chen et al., 2018). Moreover, SOE managers usually hold fewer stocks and 
options than NSOE managers do. Thus, they have less monetary incentives to sustain high 
stock prices compared to NOOE managers. Finally, SOEs also have less incentive to improve 
financial performance in order to gain access to external finance because of the close links 
between SOEs and state-owned banks in China. 
On the other hand, existing empirical evidence shows that the monitoring over 
managers is weaker in SOEs, including appointing less-professional directors (Fan et al., 2007), 
hiring lower quality auditors (Wang et al., 2008), weaker monitoring from state-owned banks 
(Chen et al., 2010), and weaker monitoring from reputable underwriters during IPOs (Chen et 
al., 2013). Prior research suggests managers of SOEs have fewer incentives to manage earnings, 
while weaker monitoring may induce more ability for managers to manage earnings in SOEs 
than in NSOEs. It is an empirical question as to whether highly-valued SOEs manage earnings 
differently from NSOEs. 
Our analyses are based on a sample of 19,107 firm-year observations with sufficient 
data from the China Securities Markets and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database over the 
period from 2003 to 2017. We use the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals estimated 
from the modified Jones model to measure accruals-based earnings management (Kothari et 
al., 2005), and use the prior year’s P/E ratio or abnormal stock returns to identify highly-valued 
firms. We find that the level of income-increasing accruals is higher for highly-valued firms. 
Further, consistent with the U.S. findings in Badertscher (2011), we find the magnitude of 
accruals management first increases for up to three years of high valuation, and the magnitude 
is reduced after the fourth year. This finding is consistent with the conjecture that the difficulty 
of consistently using accruals to manage earnings upwards increases over time because of the 
reversing nature of accruals. Instead, we find that managers turn to using real earnings 
management after four consecutive years of high valuation. These results confirm the finding 
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of Badertscher (2011) that managers’ choice of alternative earnings management mechanisms 
depends on the duration of a firm’s high valuation. 
These findings contribute to the stream of literature on the effect of firm valuation on 
earnings management. Efendi et al. (2007) find that firms that restate earnings exhibit signs of 
being overvalued in the years prior to the earnings restatement and engage in non-GAAP 
earnings management. Chi and Gupta (2009) find that overvaluation intensifies accruals 
management. Houmes and Skantz (2010) document that highly-valued firms have significantly 
higher discretionary accruals. Badertscher (2011) finds that earnings management increases the 
longer a firm is overvalued and that managers engage in accruals management to manage 
earnings in the early stages of overvaluation before switching to real earnings management to 
sustain their overvalued equity. Our study follows Badertscher (2011) and focuses on how 
sustained overvaluation affects management’s use of both accruals-based and real earnings 
management. We confirm Badertscher’s (2011) findings in the Chinese setting. 
Next, we examine whether the degree of earnings management in highly-valued firms 
differs between SOEs and NSOEs. Supporting the view that SOE managers have less incentive 
to sustain high stock price and manipulate earnings upwards, we find evidence that highly-
valued SOEs present significantly lower levels of abnormal accruals than highly-valued 
NSOEs. Our findings contribute to the literature on the cross-sectional variation in the relation 
between managers’ pressure to sustain high stock price and their earnings management 
behavior in China, an environment where this relation is likely to vary substantially between 
SOEs and NSOEs. Studies using U.S. data largely assume that the effects of high valuation on 
earnings management are uniform across firms (Badertscher, 2011; Chi and Gupta, 2009; 
Houmes and Skantz, 2010). Our findings suggest that state ownership affects this relation, i.e., 
managers of SOEs are less incentivized to manage earnings upwards even when their 
companies’ stocks are highly valued. 
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The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature 
and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research design. Section 4 describes our 
sample selection procedures and presents the results of our main tests. Section 5 reports the 
results of our additional tests on real earnings management. Section 6 reports the results of our 
robustness tests and section 7 concludes our paper. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Highly Valued Equity and Earnings Management 
According to Jensen (2005), highly-valued equities induce managers to engage in 
earnings management with the purpose of sustaining upward trends in earnings and stock prices. 
Sustaining the high stock price may benefit the managers by increasing the value of financial 
incentives such as stock options and bonuses tied to the stock price. Thus, instead of engaging 
in more transparent financial reporting to help the market correct the overvalued equity, 
managers tend to prolong overvaluation by engaging in income-increasing earnings 
management, as earnings and earnings growth are key components in determining firm value.1 
Supporting this view, Houmes and Skantz (2010) document that highly-valued firms have 
significantly higher discretionary accruals and exhibit a more pronounced positive association 
between discretionary accruals and proxies for the likelihood of failing to meet earnings targets. 
Efendi et al. (2007) demonstrate that restatement firms exhibit signs of being overvalued in the 
years prior to engaging in non-GAAP earnings management. Based on these findings, we posit 
the following hypothesis in the Chinese setting: 
H1a.  Highly valued Chinese firms exhibit higher levels of earnings management relative 
to firms with lower valuations. 
                                                 
1  Prior research shows that managers are aware of the opportunities to manage earnings (Chi and Gupta, 2009), 
investors do not see through earnings management (Xie, 2001), and that managers are rewarded for meeting 
or beating analysts’ targets by engaging in earnings management (Myers et al., 2007). 
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Moreover, managers of firms with sustained overvaluation have even stronger 
incentives to continue to meet or exceed the market’s high-performance expectation in order 
to sustain their high valuation (Badertscher, 2011). As the duration of a firm’s high valuation 
becomes longer, the pressure to meet increasingly unrealistic earnings targets becomes greater. 
Managers have to use increasingly aggressive accrual management mechanisms. However, 
Badertscher (2011) shows that, due to the reversing nature of accruals, the cost and difficulty 
of accruals management increase with the duration of overvaluation. At some point, the firm 
may run out accruals management options and resort to real earnings management, and even 
non-GAAP earnings management. 2  Thus, we test the following hypothesis based on 
Badertscher’s (2011) findings using Chinese setting: 
H1b.  As the duration of high valuation increases, the magnitude of accrual management 
in highly valued Chinese firms will first increase and then decrease. 
2.2. The Impact State Ownership on Earnings Management during periods of High Valuation 
Since the early 1980s, China has instituted a series of economic reforms to transition 
from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy. One of the most significant reforms 
was corporatization of previously solely-owned SOEs. Corporatization involves initial public 
offering of a minority portion of state-owned shares to non-state parties who can trade their 
shares freely on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, while the majority ownership 
of these listed companies is still controlled by the parent state enterprises. It aims to convert 
solely-owned SOEs into modern corporations without jeopardizing dominant public ownership. 
The effect of such ownership structure on earnings management in Chinese overvalued 
firms is twofold. On the one hand, managers in SOEs may have less incentive to manipulate 
financial performance and to sustain high valuation for the following reasons. First, managers 
                                                 
2  The tests on the subsequent real earnings management are shown in Section 5. 
8 
of China’s state-owned firms have a double identity, because of the government’s right to 
appoint managers of SOEs, leading to an overlap between political and market contracts in a 
closed pyramidal managerial labor market (Chen et al., 2018). The success of managers’ career 
is driven more by the various political and social objectives than by operating and financial 
performance (Fan et al., 2007). Moreover, CEOs of SOEs usually have fewer incentives such 
as compensation involving shares and stock options,3 while managers of NSOEs (who are 
usually the founders of the companies) hold a considerable number of shares of their own firms. 
Thus, the high valuation of SEOs provides little monetary gain to their managers. Given the 
lack of incentives to improve stock price and reported performance, CEOs of SOEs are 
relatively less likely to manage earnings. 
Second, while many decision rights have been delegated to the corporatized SOEs, the 
government retains the ultimate decision right concerning disposal of assets, and mergers and 
acquisitions. A positive aspect of this arrangement is that SOEs have very low bankruptcy risk 
because they can be subsidized by the government when they face financial distress (Faccio et 
al., 2006). In addition, because of their close linkage to state-owned banks, 4  SOEs have 
favorable access to bank loans, in contrast to NSOEs.5 State-owned banks typically prefer to 
grant loans to SOEs rather than to NSOEs, sometimes for reasons other than profit, such as 
political, ideological, and personal goals (Brandt and Li, 2003). Thus, SOEs have less incentive 
to improve financial preformance in order to gain access to external finance. Supporting this 
view, Cheng et al. (2015) find that SOEs manage earnings to a lesser degree than NSOEs do 
around IPOs. 
                                                 
3  However, they may have indirect incentives to manage earnings upwards since it may bring them higher 
prestige and other non-pecuniary benefits, including political promotion. 
4  Four state-owned banks dominate China’s banking sector. The four large state-owned banks in China are the 
Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Construction Bank of China, and the Agricultural 
Bank of China. These four big state-owned banks accounts for about 70% of the market share of the Chinese 
banking industry, while the total market share of all the state-owned banks exceeds 90%. 
5  As a result, SOEs adopt less conservative accounting because lenders are less concerned with downside risk 
for SOEs than for NSOEs (Chen et al., 2010). 
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On the other hand, empirical evidence shows that monitoring from markets and modern 
corporate governance mechanisms are weaker in SOEs, which results in the managers of SOEs 
having more ability to manipulate earnings. For example, Fan et al. (2007) show that Chinese 
firms led by politically connected CEOs have weaker and less professional governance 
mechanisms, which leads to significant underperformance in the post-IPO period compared to 
other firms. Wang et al. (2008) finds that compared with NSOEs, SOEs are more likely to 
appoint small audit firms within the same region. Chen et al. (2013) show that the negative 
relation between underwriter reputation and pre-IPO earnings management only exists for 
NSOEs, suggesting that the monitoring role of underwriters in restricting pre-IPO earnings 
management is limited for SOEs. Chen et al. (2010) show that Chinese state-owned banks grant 
loans imprudently to SOEs. 
In total, managers of SOEs have more ability to do accruals management when their 
firms are highly valued, while they also have less incentive to do so. Thus, we propose the 
following hypothesis in the null form: 
H2.  The positive relation between high valuation and earnings management is not 
different in SOEs versus NSOEs. 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Measuring Earnings Management 
Following Badertscher (2011), we estimate accruals management using the Kothari et 
al. (2005) performance-matched modified Jones model. Specifically, we first estimate the 
following regression within each industry-year to determine the “normal” or expected level of 
accruals: 
TAit = β0 1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + β1 (ΔSit - ΔREVit) + β2 PPEit + εit (1) 
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where TA is the earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus the 
operating cash flows reported in the statement of cash flows, scaled by lagged total assets 
(Collins and Hribar, 2000); Ait-1 is lagged total assets; ΔS is change in sales scaled by lagged 
total assets; ΔREV equals the change in accounts receivable scaled by lagged total assets; PPE 
equals the net value of property, plant, and equipment scaled by lagged total assets. 
Eq. (1) is estimated within each industry-year, where industry is defined using the 
industry classification code (nnindcd) reported by CSMAR. The residual from the regression, 
which we denote AQ, is the level of abnormal accrual for each firm-year. Following Kothari et 
al. (2005), we then match each firm i to an industry peer j with the closest ROA each year and 
calculate the difference of their abnormal accrual (i.e., AQit - AQjt) as our measure of earnings 
management, which we denote Match_AQ. Higher value of Match_AQ indicates more upward 
earnings manipulation. 
3.2. Identifying Highly Valued Firms 
Following prior studies (e.g., Badertscher, 2011; Houmes and Skantz, 2010), we define 
highly valued firms as those in the top quintile of lagged P/E ratio or in the top quintile of 
abnormal stock return in the previous year. The P/E ratio is widely used in practice and in prior 
research to identify overvalued firms (Houmes and Skantz, 2010). We construct an indicator 
variable, HV_PE, which equals to one if the firm’s P/E ratio is in the top quintile within our 
sample at the end of previous year, and zero otherwise. 
As an alternative identification, we also define highly valued firms using their abnormal 
stock return in the prior year. de Bondt and Thaler (1985) show that firms with prior three- and 
five-year high abnormal returns produce negative abnormal returns during the subsequent 
three- and five-year periods. We construct an indicator variable, HV_AbRet, which equals to 
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one if the firm is in the highest quantile of abnormal returns within our sample for the previous 
year, and zero otherwise.6 
3.3. Empirical model 
To test H1a, following Houmes and Skantz (2010), we run the following regression 
model: 
Match_AQit = β0 + β1 HVit + β2Sizeit + β3Leverageit + β4CFOit + β5MBit + β6ROAit  
+ β7Lossit + β8Ageit + β9Ret_Volit + β10AbBLOAit-1 + β11Big4it 
+Firm fixed effects + Year fixed effects+ εit (2) 
where Match_AQ is the performance-matched abnormal accrual measure defined in Section 
3.1. HV is one of the indicators for highly valued firms (HV_PE or HV_AbRet) defined in 
Section 3.2. The coefficient of interest in Eq. (2) is β1. A positive and significant β1 supports 
H1a, i.e., that mangers of highly valued Chinses firms are more likely to use discretionary 
accruals to manage earnings in support of high valuation. 
We also control for a battery of factors that prior research has identified as impacting 
cross-sectional variability in discretionary accruals. Dechow and Dichev (2002) show that 
larger firms record larger accruals. Larger firms with more developed and sophisticated 
financial reporting systems may also affect accrual levels (Reynolds and Francis, 2000). Thus, 
we control for the natural log of total assets (Size) in Eq. (2). Debt may serve as a monitoring 
mechanism that constrains earnings management. On the other hand, Reynolds and Francis 
(2000) provide evidence that the tendency to manage earnings increases with leverage. To 
control for the effect of high debt levels on accruals, we include Leverage, which is measured 
as a firm’s total liabilities scaled by total assets. Operating cash flows are a component of 
earnings and their levels correspond inversely with accruals. Further, the level of cash flow 
                                                 
6  Abnormal return is calculated from the accumulation of daily abnormal return over the year, where daily 
abnormal return is the residual from the market model estimated using all firms’ daily returns and daily 
market return over the year. We require that each firm-year has at least 20 valid abnormal daily stock returns 
to calculate the accumulated yearly abnormal stock return. 
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may affect the ability and/or need to use accruals, causing firms with higher operating cash 
flows to report lower discretionary accruals (Becker et al., 1998). We control for these effects 
by including operating cash flow deflated by lagged total assets (CFO). Kothari et al. (2005) 
show that discretionary accruals are impacted by firm performance. Accordingly, we include 
market-to-book ratio (MB) and income before extraordinary items divided by total assets (ROA) 
in Eq. (2). The “big bath” phenomenon is the practice of taking large write-offs when a firm 
expects to incur a loss before the write-off. Thus, ceteris paribus, loss firms are more likely to 
report negative discretionary accruals. We include an indicator variable, Loss, to control for 
this tendency, where Loss is equal to 1 if income before extraordinary items is negative, and 0 
otherwise. Following Cheng et al. (2015), we also control for a firm’s business circle and 
uncertainty by including firm age (Age) and daily stock return volatility during the year 
(Ret_Vol) in Eq. (2). Since accruals ultimately must reverse, if a firm is consistently aggressive 
in its accounting practices, accumulated balance sheet accruals (net operating assets) will at 
some point begin to constrain the firm’s use of future income increasing accruals. Thus, we 
control for industry-adjusted net operating assets (abnormal balance sheet bloat, AbBLOA) for 
the previous year to measure the constraint on income increasing accruals (Badertscher, 2011; 
Ettredge et al., 2007). Becker et al. (1998) document that firms with non-Big Six auditors report 
more income-increasing discretionary accruals than clients of Big Six auditors. Chen et al. 
(2001) and DeFond et al. (2000) find that the Big 10 audit firms in China supply higher quality 
audits. We include an indicator variable equal to one for the Chinese Big 10 audit firms (Big10), 
where the Big 10 are identified based on a ranking of revenue.7 
                                                 
7  According to the information provided by CICPA, the top 10 audit firms in China are: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Zhongtian (PwC), Deloitte Huayong, BDO China Shu Lun Pan, Ernst & Young 
Huaming, KPMG Huazhen, Ruihua, Pan-China, Moore Stephens Da Hua, Grant Thornton Zhitong, and 
ShineWing. Source: http://www.cicpa.org.cn/BNIE/201806/W020180612523260007725.pdf. 
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Finally, we include both firm and year fixed effects to control for time-invariant 
heterogeneity at the firm level and time-varying heterogeneity. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level to mitigate heteroscedasticity and arbitrary within-firm correlation (Petersen, 
2009). 
Next, to investigate how the duration of high valuation affect earnings management and 
test H1b, we follow Badertscher (2011) and estimate the following regression model: 
Match_AQ =  β0 +Ʃβ1-5 HV(i)it + Controls +Firm fixed effects  
 + Year fixed effects+ εit (3) 
where HV(i)it is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has been in the top quintile of 
abnormal return for i consecutive years (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5), and 0 otherwise. The control 
variables are identical to those included in Eq. (2). The coefficients of interest in Eq. (3) are β1 
through β5. Positive and statistically significant coefficients on HV(i) would be consistent with 
firms continuing to engage in earnings management at varying lengths of overvaluation. More 
interesting is the pattern of the (positive) coefficients on HV(i). Based on the findings of 
Badertscher (2011) using U.S. data,8 we expect βi to be first increasing (as managers are under 
increasing pressure of sustained high valuation) and subsequently decreasing (consistent with 
the reversing nature of accruals, which makes it increasingly difficult to engage in upwards 
earnings management through accruals). 
To test the effect of state ownership on accrual management in highly-valued firms, we 
further include the interaction terms of an indicator for SOEs (SOE) and the series of indicator 
for the duration of high valuation (HV(i)) into Eq. (3) and estimate the following regression 
model: 
Match_AQ =  β0 +Ʃβ1-5 HV(i)it×SOEi +Ʃβ5-10 HV(i)it + Controls +Firm fixed effects  
 + Year fixed effects+ εit (4) 
                                                 
8  Badertscher (2011) finds that earnings management increases for the first three years and then levels off (i.e., 
β1 < β2 < β3 > β4 > β5). 
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The coefficients of interest in Eq. (4) are β1 through β5. As the coefficients on HV(i) are 
positive, significantly negative (positive) β1 through β5 would reject the null form of H2 and 
support the view that managers in SOEs are less (more) likely to manipulate earnings upwards 
when their firms are highly valued, compared to managers of NSOEs. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Data and sample selection 
Our data consist of all Chinese non-financial firm-year observations from 2003 to 2017. 
The ownership information is collected from CSMAR’s China Listed Firm’s Shareholders 
Research Database, which is available from 2003 on. We collect all the financial, stock return 
and auditor-related data from the CSMAR database. Panel A of Table 1 summarizes our sample 
selection procedures. We require at least 10 firms in each industry per year to estimate 
abnormal accruals, and the firm-year observations in each industry should have sufficient data 
to calculate all the variables in Eq. (2). Following the sample selection criteria, we obtain 
19,107 firm-year observations in our final sample over the period from 2003 to 2017. 
[Table 1 Here] 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our sample. 
The mean and median value of Match_AQ are close to zero, with a 25th percentile of -0.061 
and the 75th percentile of 0.059, which is similar to the same measure in prior U.S. studies 
(e.g., Badertscher, 2011). The figures of other control variables are also comparable to prior 
studies using Chinese data (e.g., Chen et al., 2018). Panel B of Table 2 reports the distribution 
of our sample by ownership type (SOEs vs. NSOEs), showing that SOEs are larger in size, 
more leveraged, have more net operating cash flows, have lower market-to-book ratio, and of 
longer age, consistent with prior studies (Chen et al., 2011; Cheng et al., 2015). 
[Table 2 Here] 
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4.2. Main results 
Table 3 reports the regression results of Eq. (2). The dependent variable is performance 
matched discretionary accruals (Match_AQ), which reflects the level of income-increasing 
earnings management. We control for both firm and year fixed effects and cluster the standard 
error at the firm level. In column (1), we use the indicator for firms in the top quintile of lagged 
P/E ratio to define highly-valued firms, while in column (2) we use abnormal stock returns 
during the prior year. In both columns, the coefficients on the indicator of highly-valued firms 
(HV) are positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that the discretionary 
accruals are higher for highly-valued firms. In terms of economic significance, highly-valued 
firms have, on average, 6.51% to 7.73% standard deviation higher Match_AQ than other firms 
in the sample. 9  These results support H1 that the level of income-increasing earnings 
management is higher for highly-valued firms. 
In addition, we find that the level of Match_AQ increases with firm size, leverage, 
profitability and firm age, while decreasing with net operating cash flow, which is consistent 
with the findings of Badertscher (2011) who uses U.S. data. However, the coefficients on Big10 
are negative but statistically insignificant, suggesting that Chinses auditors, on average, do not 
play a significant role in restricting firms’ earnings management (Chen et al., 2001; Cheng et 
al., 2015). This finding is consistent with the argument that the institutional environment is 
underdeveloped in China compared to the U.S. 
[Table 3 Here] 
Table 4 reports the regression results of Eq. (3). In column (1) where lagged P/E ratio 
is used to identify highly-valued firms, the coefficients on HV(1) (p  < 0.05), HV(2) (p  < 0.01) 
and HV(3) (p  < 0.01) are all positive and significant, while the coefficients on HV(4) and HV(5) 
                                                 
9  These figures are calculated using the coefficients on HV (0.0083448 in column (1) and 0.0070208 in column 
(2)) divided by the standard deviation of Match_AQ (0.1079091) in our sample. 
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are not significant. In column (2) where prior year’s abnormal return is used to identify highly-
valued firms, the coefficients on HV(1) (p  < 0.01), HV(2) (p  < 0.10) and HV(3) (p  < 0.10) are 
positive and significant, while the coefficients on HV(4) and HV(5) are not significant. These 
results suggest that overvalued firms significantly engage in more earnings management, 
relative to firms that are not overvalued, up to three years of the high valuation. Consistent with 
Badertscher (2011), it appears that the earnings management through accruals increases for the 
first three years and then levels off. However, the coefficients on HV(4) and HV(5) are less 
significant than those documented in Badertscher's (2011) U.S. study. 
[Table 4 Here] 
4.3. The Effects of State Ownership 
After documenting that highly-valued firms are associated with more earning-
increasing accrual management in China for three years of high-valuation, we investigate the 
effect of Chinese state ownership on this relation by estimating Eq. (4). The regression results 
are shown in Table 5. In column (1) where lagged P/E ratio is used to identify highly-valued 
firms, the coefficients on HV(1)×SOE (p  < 0.01), HV(2)×SOE (p  < 0.01), HV(3)×SOE (p < 
0.05) and HV(4)×SOE (p < 0.01) are negative and significant, while the coefficient on 
HV(5)×SOE is not significant. These results suggest that state ownership significantly mitigates 
the effect of high valuation on earnings management. The pattern of the coefficients on HV(i) 
are consistent with those reported in Table 3, (i.e., β1 < β2 < β3 > β4 > β5). Notably, differing 
from the result in column (1) of Table 3, the coefficient on HV(4) is positively and significant, 
suggesting that, on average, NSOEs continue to manage earnings upwards for up to four years 
of high valuation. 
In column (2) where prior year’s abnormal return is used to identify highly-valued firms, 
the coefficients on HV(1)×SOE (p  < 0.01), HV(2)×SOE (p  < 0.05) and HV(3)×SOE (p  < 0.05) 
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are negative and significant, while the coefficients on HV(4)×SOE and HV(5)×SOE are not 
significant. In total, the degree of income-increasing earnings management in the presence of 
high valuation is significantly lower in SOEs than in NSOEs. These results reject the null form 
of H2 and suggest that the managers of SOEs are less incentivized to use accrual to sustain the 
high valuation than managers of NSOEs. 
[Table 5 Here] 
5. Tests on Real Earnings Management 
In the previous sections we document that Chinese firms tend to manage earnings 
upwards using accruals-based earnings management. In addition to accruals management, 
earnings management also includes real activities manipulation, or real earnings management, 
which refers to the purposeful altering of reported earnings in a particular direction by changing 
the timing or structuring of an operating, investing, or financing decision (Roychowdhury, 
2006). Cohen and Zarowin (2010) show that firms engage in real activities manipulation 
around seasoned equity offerings (SEO), and the decline in post-SEO performance is driven 
more by real activities management than by accrual reversals. 
Prior studies show that, because real earnings management activities are less likely to 
be scrutinized by auditors and regulators, managers make choices between the two earnings 
management strategies according to their ability to use accruals management and the costs of 
doing so (Zang, 2012). For example, Cohen et al. (2008) document that the level of accruals-
based earnings management declines steadily after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 
while real earnings management activities increase significantly during the same period. Their 
results suggest that because SOX increases the difficulty of accruals management, managers 
switch to real earnings management methods after the passage of SOX. Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010) show firms’ choices of real instead of accruals-based earnings management activities 
around SEOs increase with audit quality and litigation risk. Enomoto et al. (2015) examines 
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the differences in accrual-based and real earnings management across countries from the 
perspective of investor protection. They find that managers in countries with stronger investor 
protection tend to engage in real earnings management instead of accruals-based earnings 
management, and this relation is constrained by more analyst following. Chan et al. (2015) 
show that the adoption of clawback clauses is associated with an increase in real earnings 
management, especially for firms with high growth or high transient institutional ownership. 
Sohn (2016) find that managers’ real earnings management increases whereas their accrual-
based earnings management decreases with the degree of their firms’ financial statement 
comparability, and this relation is mitigated by better information environment and higher audit 
quality. 
Badertscher (2011) find that, in the U.S., as the duration of overvaluation increases, 
overvalued firms initially engage in accruals-based earnings management and then resort to 
real activities management. The underlying reason is the reversing nature of accruals, which 
makes it increasingly difficult for managers to manipulate accruals upwards over time. Thus, 
managers will subsequently turn to a substitute for accruals management, i.e., real earnings 
management. Based on their findings, we predict that the magnitude of real earnings 
management of Chinese highly-valued firms increases with the duration of extreme valuation, 
especially when they run out of accruals management choices (i.e., after three years as 
identified in the previous section). In addition, consistent with our findings reported earlier we 
predict that these effects of high valuation on real earnings management are less pronounced 
for SOEs than for NSOEs. 
We measure real earnings management as a composite score of three proxies based on 
prior research. The first is modeling cash flow from operations, which includes accelerating 
the timing of sales or generating unsustainable sales via increased price discounts or more 
lenient credit terms. Following Roychowdhury (2006), we express normal cash flow from 
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operations as a linear function of sales and prior period change in sales. We estimate the 
following cross-sectional regression by industry-year: 
CFOit = β0 1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1+ β1 Sit + β2 ΔSit + εit (5) 
where Sit equals net sales scaled by lagged total assets. All other variables are as defined 
previously. Abnormal cash flow from operations (AbCFO) is measured as the estimated 
residual from Equation (5). 
Next, we estimate the abnormal decrease in the amount of discretionary expenditures, 
AbDISEXP. Prior research suggests that managers cut discretionary expenses in order to 
manage earnings. Following Roychowdhury (2006), we estimate the following regression by 
industry-year: 
DISEXPit = β0 1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1+ β1 Sit + β2 ΔSit + εit (6) 
where DISEXPit equals R&D expense plus advertising expense plus selling, general, and 
administrative expenses, scaled by lagged total assets. All other variables are as defined 
previously. For every firm-year, AbDISEXP is the estimated residual from Equation (6). 
The third proxy is abnormally high inventory production (AbPROD). To manage 
earnings upward, managers can overproduce inventory in order to lower cost of goods sold by 
allocating more fixed manufacturing overhead to inventory. To capture the amount of AbPROD, 
we estimate the abnormal level of production costs within each industry-year: 
PRODit = β0 1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1+ β1 Sit + β2 ΔSit + β2 ΔSit-1 + εit (7) 
where PRODit equals the cost of goods sold plus change in inventory, scaled by lagged total 
assets. All other variables are as previously defined. For every firm-year, AbPROD is the 
estimated residual from Equation (7). Finally, we construct an overall proxy for real earnings 
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management, RTM, which equals to (– AbCFO – AbDISEXP + AbPROD) (Badertscher, 
2011).10 
We then estimate the Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) with dependent variables replaced with RTM 
to estimate the effect of (duration of) high valuation on real earnings management, as well as 
the moderating effects of state ownership. The regressions are specified as follows: 
RTMit =  β0 +Ʃβ1-5 HV(i)it + Controls + Firm fixed effects + Year fixed effects + εit (8) 
RTMit =  β0 +Ʃβ1-5 HV(i)it×SOEi +Ʃβ6-10 HV(i)it + Controls + Firm fixed effects  
 + Year fixed effects+ εit (9) 
The regression results of estimating Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) are shown in column (1) and 
column (2) of Table 6, respectively. In column (1), the coefficients on HV(1) and HV(2) are 
not significant, while the coefficients on HV(3) (p  < 0.10), HV(4) (p  <0 .05) and HV(5) (p < 
0.01) are positive and significant. These results are consistent with the findings of Badertscher 
(2011) and suggest that accrual management segues into real earnings management as high 
valuation persists. In column (2), the coefficients on HV(3)×SOE and HV(4)×SOE are negative 
and significant (p < 0.10), suggesting that managers of SOEs are less likely to use real earnings 
management when high valuation persists. However, the coefficient of HV(4)×SOE is not 
robust to using HV_AbRet to identify high valuation firms. In total, we provide some evidence 
that state ownership also disinclines managers to use real earnings management to sustain 
extreme valuation after P/E ratio is high for over three years. 
[Table 6 Here] 
6. Robustness Tests 
In an U.S. study, Houmes et al. (2013) find that higher-quality auditors (proxied by 
Big-N auditor indicators) mitigate the effect of high valuation on earnings management. In our 
                                                 
10  We multiply AbCFO and AbDISEXP by -1 before summing so that larger values of RTM suggest greater use 
of real earnings management. 
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results reported in the previous sections, we included a Big-10 auditor indicator variable in our 
regressions. However, because the audit market structure in China is largely different from that 
in the U.S. (DeFond et al., 2000), it is possible that we omit some dimension of audit quality 
in our setting. As a robustness check, we further include an array of input-based audit quality 
measures, including log of audit fee (LogAF), number of days between fiscal year-end and the 
issuance of the audit report (AuditLag), and an indicator for industry specialist (defined as the 
audit firm with the highest market share within each industry-year) (ISP). Untabulated results 
show that our results documented in the previous sections are qualitatively unchanged after 
controlling for these proxies for audit quality. 
We also re-run all the tests above using a reduced sample from 2010 to alleviate the 
impact of the Global Financial Crisis. Untabulated results show that our results are robust to 
excluding the GFC period. 
7. Conclusions 
Using a sample of 19,107 firm-year observations with sufficient data on the China 
Securities Markets and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database over the period from 2003 to 
2017, we examine how state ownership affects Chinese firms’ earning management during a 
period of high valuation. We find the magnitude of accruals management first increases for up 
to three years of high valuation, and then reduces after the fourth year. This finding is consistent 
with the view that the difficulty of consistently using accruals to manage earnings upwards 
increases over time because of the reversing nature of accruals. We find that managers turn to 
using real earnings management after four consecutive years of high valuation.  Importantly, 
we find evidence that highly-valued SOEs have significantly lower level of abnormal accruals 
than highly-valued NSOEs and lower levels of real earnings management after four 
consecutive years of high valuation. Our findings contribute to the literature on the cross-
sectional variation in the relation between managers’ pressure to sustain high stock prices and 
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their earnings management behavior in China, an environment where this relation is likely to 
vary substantially between SOEs and NSOEs. Studies using U.S. data typically assume that the 
effects of high valuation on earnings management are uniform across firms. Our findings 
suggest that state ownership affects this relation. 
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Appendix. Variable definitions 
Variable Definitions 
Match_AQ Amount of accruals management derived from the performance-matched 
modified Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005). 
RTM Amount of real transactions management, which is the sum of 
AbnDISEXP, AbnCFO, and AbnPROD. 
HV_PE An indicator variable that equals to one if the firm’s P/E ratio is in the top 
quintile within our sample at the end of previous year, and zero otherwise. 
HV_RetAb An indicator variable that equals to one if the firm’s yearly abnormal stock 
return is in the top quintile within our sample at the end of previous year, 
and zero otherwise. 
Size Natural log of total assets. 
Leverage Book value of total liability over total assets. 
CFO Net operating cash flow scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
MB Ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of total assets. 
ROA Operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the year. 
Loss An indicator variable that equals to one if the firm report negative net 
income, and zero otherwise. 
Age Number of years since the firm is listed in the stock market. 
Ret_Vol Standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock return during the year. 
AbBLOAT Abnormal balance sheet bloat. Balance sheet bloat is net operating assets 
scaled by total sales. AbBLOA equals to the firm-specific balance sheet 
bloat minus the industry median balance sheet bloat. 
SOE An indicator for state-owned company. 
Big10 An indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor for the fiscal year 
is one of the top 10 auditing firms in China by revenue as in 2017, and zero 
otherwise. Specifically, the top ten audit firms are: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Zhongtian (PwC), Deloitte Huayong, BDO 
China Shu Lun Pan, Ernst & Young Huaming, KPMG Huazhen, Ruihua, 
Pan-China, Moore Stephens Da Hua, Grant Thornton Zhitong, and 
ShineWing. 
LogAF Log of audit fee of the firm during the fiscal year. 
AuditLag Number of days between fiscal year-end and the issuance of the audit 
opinion. 
ISP A dummy variable that equals to one if the firm is engaged with an auditor 
with the highest market share for the firm’s industry during that year. 
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Table 1 Sample Selection 
 
All firm-year observations listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
from 2003 to 2017 29,854 
Less:  
Financial firms (first digit of nnindcd is J) (828) 
Observations without variables to estimate modified Jones model and industry-
year with less than ten observations (5,425) 
Observations without sufficient data to calculate lagged P/E ratio or lagged 
abnormal return (we require that each firm-year has at least 20 valid abnormal 
daily stock returns to calculate the accumulated yearly abnormal stock return). 
(3,961) 
Observations without data on other control variables in Eq. (2) (533) 




Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A Descriptive statistics for full sample 
 Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
Match_AQ -0.000 0.108 -0.061 0.000 0.059 
HV_PE 0.195     
HV_RetAb 0.202     
Size 21.988 1.257 21.106 21.839 22.712 
Leverage 0.478 0.194 0.332 0.487 0.627 
CFO 0.017 0.083 -0.018 0.015 0.059 
MB 3.887 4.169 1.462 2.919 4.441 
ROA 0.046 0.064 0.015 0.038 0.072 
Loss 0.095     
Age 14.016 5.585 10.000 14.000 18.000 
Ret_Vol 0.023 0.007 0.017 0.021 0.027 
AbBLOAT -1.507 7.664 -1.123 -0.470 0.149 
Big10 0.364     
RTM -0.004 0.147 -0.083 -0.001 0.077 
n 19,107 
 
Panel B Descriptive statistics by ownership type 
 SOEs (n = 8,870) NSOEs (n = 10,237) 
 Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
Match_AQ -0.001 0.001 0.106 -0.001 -0.002 0.110 
HV_PE 0.210 0.000 0.407 0.164 0.000 0.370 
HV_RetAb 0.194 0.000 0.395 0.208 0.000 0.406 
Size 22.118 21.983 1.268 21.876 21.719 1.236 
Leverage 0.515 0.528 0.189 0.447 0.450 0.198 
CFO 0.018 0.014 0.083 0.016 0.016 0.083 
MB 3.638 2.621 3.553 4.103 3.086 3.679 
ROA 0.041 0.033 0.063 0.051 0.043 0.065 
Loss 0.108 0.000 0.310 0.085 0.000 0.279 
Age 14.418 14.000 5.486 13.668 13.000 5.647 
Ret_Vol 0.022 0.021 0.007 0.023 0.022 0.007 
AbBLOAT -1.742 -0.533 8.339 -1.303 -0.421 7.021 
Big10 0.364 0.000 0.481 0.364 0.000 0.481 
RTM -0.003 0.004 0.141 -0.009 -0.003 0.155 
This table reports the distribution of variables in the final sample used in our main test. The sample 
contains firm-year observations from 2003 to 2016 with no missing values for all variables. All 
continuous independent variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one-percentiles. See Appendix 




Table 3 High valuation and earnings management 
Dep. = Match_AQ 
 (1) (2) 
 HV_PE HV_RetAb 
HV 0.008*** 0.007*** 
 (3.82) (3.75) 
Size 0.004** 0.002 
 (2.02) (1.08) 
Leverage 0.001 0.003* 
 (0.57) (1.70) 
CFO -0.831*** -0.830*** 
 (-65.23) (-64.44) 
MB -0.000 0.000 
 (-1.08) (1.14) 
ROA 0.318*** 0.317*** 
 (14.62) (13.98) 
Loss -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.77) (-0.75) 
Age 0.024*** 0.032*** 
 (3.05) (4.98) 
Ret_Vol -0.085 -0.228 
 (-0.48) (-1.34) 
AbBLOAT -0.000 0.000 
 (-0.01) (0.38) 
Big10 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.88) (0.86) 
Constant -0.258** -0.406*** 
 (-2.16) (-4.13) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 19,107 19,107 
Adj. R2 0.353 0.346 
This table reports results of our main tests. All continuous independent variables are winsorized at 
the top and bottom one-percentiles. The t-values reported in parentheses are based on standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels for 
two-tailed tests, respectively. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 4 Duration of high valuation  
Dep. = Match_AQ 
 (1) (2) 
 HV_PE HV_RetAb 
HV(1) 0.006** 0.006*** 
 (2.48) (3.27) 
HV(2) 0.013*** 0.008* 
 (3.21) (1.76) 
HV(3) 0.017*** 0.018* 
 (3.02) (1.71) 
HV(4) 0.011 0.012 
 (1.42) (0.96) 
HV(5) 0.007 0.001 
 (0.86) (0.03) 
Size 0.004** 0.002 
 (2.02) (1.13) 
Leverage 0.001 0.003* 
 (0.57) (1.68) 
CFO -0.831*** -0.830*** 
 (-65.27) (-64.36) 
MB -0.000 0.000 
 (-1.06) (1.08) 
ROA 0.318*** 0.316*** 
 (14.62) (13.88) 
Loss -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.75) (-0.77) 
Age 0.024*** 0.032*** 
 (3.05) (4.97) 
Ret_Vol -0.085 -0.226 
 (-0.48) (-1.33) 
AbBLOA -0.000 0.000 
 (-0.01) (0.38) 
Big10 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.89) (0.87) 
Constant -0.256** -0.403*** 
 (-2.16) (-4.10) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 19,107 19,107 
Adj. R2 0.353 0.346 
This table reports results of our main tests. All continuous independent variables are winsorized at 
the top and bottom one-percentiles. The t-values reported in parentheses are based on standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels for 
two-tailed tests, respectively. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 5 The effects of state ownership 
Dep. = Match_AQ 
 (1) (2) 
 HV_PE HV_RetAb 
HV(1)×SOE -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (-3.02) (-2.66) 
HV(2)×SOE -0.017*** -0.014** 
 (-3.26) (-2.33) 
HV(3)×SOE -0.023** -0.027** 
 (-2.30) (-2.02) 
HV(4)×SOE -0.029*** -0.015 
 (-2.59) (-0.34) 
HV(5)×SOE -0.007 0.069 
 (-0.66) (1.35) 
HV(1) 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (3.91) (4.13) 
HV(2) 0.020*** 0.013*** 
 (4.57) (2.77) 
HV(3) 0.022*** 0.031*** 
 (3.50) (2.96) 
HV(4) 0.022** 0.020 
 (2.33) (0.97) 
HV(5) 0.009 0.014 
 (0.88) (0.26) 
Size 0.004* -0.002 
 (1.91) (-1.15) 
Leverage 0.001 0.003* 
 (0.56) (1.71) 
CFO -0.831*** -0.829*** 
 (-65.57) (-64.54) 
MB -0.000 0.000 
 (-1.27) (1.09) 
ROA 0.317*** 0.314*** 
 (14.62) (13.83) 
Loss -0.002 -0.003 
 (-0.73) (-0.85) 
Age 0.030*** 0.034*** 
 (3.22) (5.43) 
Ret_Vol -0.074 -0.226 
 (-0.42) (-1.32) 
AbBLOA -0.000 0.000 
 (-0.02) (0.35) 
Big10 -0.007 0.004 
 (0.98) (0.84) 
Constant -0.342** -0.433*** 
 (-2.48) (-4.49) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
32 
Observations 19,107 19,107 
Adj. R2 0.354 0.346 
This table reports results of our robustness tests controlling for firm-fixed effects. All continuous 
independent variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one-percentiles. The t-values reported in 
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels for two-tailed tests, respectively. See Appendix for 
variable definitions.   
33 
Table 6 Tests on real earnings management 
Dep. = RTM 
 (1) (2) 
HV_PE(1) 0.002 0.001 
 (0.68) (0.41) 
HV_PE(2) 0.000 0.005 
 (0.09) (1.33) 
HV_PE(3) 0.015* 0.023** 
 (1.75) (2.53) 
HV_PE(4) 0.027** 0.038*** 
 (2.17) (2.64) 
HV_PE(5) 0.033*** 0.035*** 
 (2.86) (2.95) 
HV_PE(1)×SOE  0.003 
  (0.55) 
HV_PE(2)×SOE  -0.005 
  (-0.59) 
HV_PE(3)×SOE  -0.017* 
  (-1.82) 
HV_PE(4)×SOE  -0.013* 
  (-1.79) 
HV_PE(5)×SOE  -0.009 
  (-0.46) 
Size 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (3.70) (3.75) 
Leverage 0.003 0.003 
 (1.35) (1.34) 
CFO -1.073*** -1.072*** 
 (-54.24) (-54.16) 
MB 0.001 0.001 
 (1.22) (1.18) 
ROA -0.187*** -0.188*** 
 (-5.57) (-5.58) 
Loss -0.024*** -0.024*** 
 (-5.83) (-5.79) 
Age -0.046 -0.039 
 (-1.06) (-0.87) 
Ret_Vol -0.252 -0.245 
 (-1.12) (-1.09) 
AbBLOA 0.000 0.000 
 (0.31) (0.33) 
Big10 -0.004 -0.004 
 (-1.23) (-1.15) 
Constant 0.433 0.336 
 (0.70) (0.52) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 15,239 15,239 
34 
Adj. R2 0.656 0.656 
This table reports results of our additional analysis on real earnings management. All continuous 
independent variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one-percentiles. The t-values reported in 
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels for two-tailed tests, respectively. See Appendix for 
variable definitions. 
 
